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NOTES & COMMENTS 
Manure Management for Climate Change 
Mitigation: Regulating CAFO  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
Under the Clean Air Act 
KATRINA A. TOMAS* 
Climate change is the defining challenge of our time, 
which if unbridled, will imperil our communities and the vi-
ability of future generations. Efforts to reduce global tem-
perature rise require more than merely reforming carbon di-
oxide emissions from the energy and transportation sectors. 
Notably, climate solutions cannot be reached without simul-
taneously addressing the more potent methane and nitrous 
oxide gases. In the United States, intensive factory farms, le-
gally known as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(“CAFOs”), are responsible for large emissions of these two 
greenhouse gases due to manure mismanagement. While 
there are no federal environmental regulations in place for 
mitigating CAFOs’ climate effects, existing greenhouse gas 
frameworks within the Clean Air Act may provide a solution. 
This Note analyzes Clean Air Act provisions that allow me-
thane and nitrous oxide regulation and assesses the viability 
of applying these statute sections to CAFOs in order to curb 
emissions from the livestock sector and mitigate climate im-
pacts.  
                                                                                                         
 *  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2016, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank Professors Ileana Porras and Randall S. 
Abate for their insights and guidance. I thank the University of Miami Law Review 
for selecting my Note for publication, and the editorial staff for all their dedication 
both on my Note and this entire issue. Specifically, I am grateful to Elizabeth 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of climate policy within the United States cen-
ters on reducing fossil fuel consumption.1 However, reducing car-
bon dioxide emissions from the energy and transportation sector 
alone will not mitigate climate change.2 Concentrating emission 
modification efforts exclusively within the transportation and en-
ergy sectors is insufficient. Currently, methane, nitrous oxide, and 
other “non-[carbon dioxide] greenhouse gases contribute a third of 
                                                                                                         
 1  See Global Warming Solutions: Reduce Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-warming/solutions/global-
warming-solutions-reduce-emissions#.W6ZXAXNKGNU (last visited Sept. 22, 
2018). 
 2  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 17–18 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
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total anthropogenic [carbon dioxide] equivalent emissions.”3 Only 
with large simultaneous reductions in carbon dioxide and non-car-
bon dioxide emissions will there be any hope of meeting the 2050 
target of limiting global temperature rise to less than two degrees 
Celsius set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”).4  
Methane and nitrous oxide are the two most abundant non-car-
bon dioxide greenhouse gases.5 Because they are more potent and 
have shorter atmospheric lifetimes than carbon dioxide, these gases 
hold the potential for more rapid reductions in radiative forcing than 
would be possible by controlling emissions of carbon dioxide 
alone.6 In the United States, agriculture is responsible for about 
eighty percent (80%) of nitrous oxide emissions and about thirty-
five percent (35%) of methane emissions.7 The largest source of ag-
ricultural greenhouse gas emissions stems from the excretions of an-
imals in the livestock industry.8 Enteric fermentation, which pro-
duces methane through the belching and exhalation of ruminants—
mostly cows and sheep in the United States—“is responsible for 
32% of all agricultural emissions and 25% of methane emissions in 
                                                                                                         
 3  William J. Ripple et al., Commentary: Ruminants, Climate Change and 
Climate Policy, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, Jan. 2014, at 2, 2. 
 4  See id.; see also 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–19; John C. 
Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero-Carbon Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,780, 10,781 (2016).  
 5  Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2; see Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Me-
thane Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/ 
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#methane (last visited Dec. 29, 2018); 
Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases# 
nitrous-oxide (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 6  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assess-
ment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
 7  U.S. EPA, EPA 430-R-18-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2016, at ES-21 (2018) (stating that 25.9% of methane 
emissions came from enteric fermentation and 10.3% from manure management) 
[hereinafter EPA INVENTORY]. 
 8  Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral 
Agriculture, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,845, 10,846–48 (2017). 
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the United States.”9 Moreover, “[m]anure management activi-
ties . . . releas[e] nitrous oxide and methane in quantities that total 
16% of total [United States] agricultural emissions.”10  
Emissions from both enteric fermentation and manure are a re-
sult of intensive factory farms, legally known as Concentrated Ani-
mal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), that have taken over the mod-
ern livestock industry.11 Setting a national framework for methane 
and nitrous oxide emissions from CAFOs is paramount. Relying on 
states may provide localized standards that will undoubtedly help 
mitigation efforts. However, the lack of a federal emission threshold 
may cause corporate farms to move production to states with lax 
policies, thus creating a deterioration of standards known as a “race 
to the bottom.”12  
In the United States, national frameworks for environmental 
compliance are set through regulations promulgated by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Agency”), an administrative 
agency.13 The EPA currently regulates carbon-based emissions from 
                                                                                                         
 9  Id. at 10,847. 
 10  Id. 
 11  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): Animal Feed-
ing Operations (AFOs), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa. 
gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) [hereinaf-
ter Animal Feeding Operations]; see JAMES M. MACDONALD & WILLIAM D. 
MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. LIVESTOCK AG-
RICULTURE: SCALE, EFFICIENCY, AND RISKS 3, 5–6, 12 (2009). The image of 
America as a mostly agrarian society has been “replaced by vast sheds hulking 
over the plains, housing tens of thousands of animals each,” prompting countries 
around the world to follow suit in the mass industrialization of animal agriculture. 
Fiona Harvey et al., Rise of Mega Farms: How the US Model of Intensive Farming 
Is Invading the World, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2017, 11:06 AM), https://www.the 
guardian.com/environment/2017/jul/18/rise-of-mega-farms-how-the-us-model-
of-intensive-farming-is-invading-the-world.  
 12  For a discussion on whether environmental regulation should be left to the 
states or the federal government, see generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race to 
the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 535, 538–540 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Reply to Professor 
Revesz’s Response in “The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Leg-
islation,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295, 296–99 (1998).  
 13  See, e.g., Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) 
[hereinafter Overview of the Clean Air Act]. 
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cars, coal-fired power plants, and other greenhouse gas emitters un-
der the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by establishing a national standard 
for mitigating the industries’ production of greenhouse gases.14 The 
EPA needs to similarly hold the animal agriculture sector accounta-
ble by enforcing the existing CAA framework in order to ensure a 
decrease in methane and nitrous oxide emissions. 
However, there are currently no federal environmental regula-
tions in place for mitigating the livestock industry’s effects on cli-
mate change.15 Regulating CAFOs at the federal level under any en-
vironmental provision has only seen success through the Clean Wa-
ter Act (“CWA”)—a statute administered by the EPA—for the pur-
poses of controlling point source pollution into United States water-
ways.16 Nevertheless, controlling greenhouse gas emissions from 
CAFOs is not entirely an impossibility under existing federal envi-
ronmental laws. Discrete provisions of the CAA—sections 108, 
109, and 111—provide opportunities to set national greenhouse gas 
emission threshold standards for CAFOs.17  
This Note seeks to analyze the CAA provisions that allow me-
thane and nitrous oxide regulation and assess the viability of apply-
ing these statute sections to CAFOs. Part I provides background on 
the relationship between climate change and animal excretions from 
the livestock industry in the United States. Part II discusses the ex-
isting regulatory framework that governs CAFOs and greenhouse 
gas emissions. It explains that the EPA is empowered to and capable 
                                                                                                         
 14  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60 (2018). 
 15  “From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the interest in animal 
agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources,” which has resulted in 
regulatory provisions addressing CAFO impacts in the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”). CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32947, AIR QUAL-
ITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: EPA’S AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT 2–
3 (2014) [hereinafter AIR QUALITY ISSUES]. The EPA’s attempts to regulate 
CAFOs under the CAA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), and Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”) aimed at addressing pollution affecting air qual-
ity, rather than climate change. See id. 
 16  40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e) (promulgated pursuant to the power delegated by 33 
U.S.C. § 1342). 
 17  42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7411 (2012). For purposes of clarity and accu-
racy, this Note provides citations to the corresponding U.S. Code sections of the 
CAA. Short-form citations are also to the U.S. Code sections. 
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of regulating CAFOs’ greenhouse gas emissions through the CAA. 
Part III concludes by arguing for the application of existing CAA 
provisions to CAFOs and explains how to successfully navigate the 
legal roadblocks that seemingly prevent regulating CAFOs’ green-
house gas emissions. 
I. ANIMAL AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
In the United States, the animal agriculture industry has shifted 
considerably in recent years towards corporate or factory farms, 
known for regulatory purposes as Animal Feeding Operations 
(“AFOs”) or Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), 
depending on their size.18 The EPA defines CAFOs as any lot or 
facility where animals “have been, are, or will be stabled or confined 
and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month 
period,” and where “crops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-har-
vest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season.”19 In 
effect, CAFOs “congregate animals, feed, manure, dead animals, 
and production operations on a small land area.”20 Currently, over 
ten billion food animals are raised and slaughtered every year in the 
United States alone.21  
Admittedly, the industrialization of  animal agriculture has made 
the industry more efficient and has consequently lowered consumer 
costs of animal products.22 However, these gains come with serious 
                                                                                                         
 18  See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)–(2); MACDONALD & MCBRIDE, supra note 
11 (analyzing the major shift toward large-scale industrialized production systems 
in the U.S. livestock industry). 
 19  40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i). 
 20  Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Program for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agricultural-ani-
mal-production, (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) [hereinafter NPDES for CAFOs]; see 
also Animal Feeding Operations, supra note 11.  
 21  Michelle Buckley, Comment, This Waiting Game Stinks: The Lack of EPA 
Progress in Regulating Air Emissions from Animal Agriculture, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2011). 
 22  See MACDONALD & MCBRIDE, supra note 11, at 2. (“New technologies 
often reduce costs directly, by allowing more meat and milk to be produced for a 
given amount of land, feed, labor, and capital. . . . [L]ower industrywide farm 
costs lead to lower prices for farm commodities.”).  
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externalities, such as harm to animal welfare23 and antibiotic re-
sistance as a result of routine use on animals.24 Additionally, be-
cause of large scale productions, rural communities and low-income 
communities of color disproportionately suffer and are forced to 
deal directly with catastrophic air and water pollution.25  
Due to the number of animals raised in these facilities, CAFOs 
produce massive volumes of waste.26 Under traditional agricultural 
practices, animal waste is deposited throughout the environments 
the livestock forage.27 However, animals within CAFOs do not 
graze in pastures and are confined in anywhere from three to thirty 
buildings with slated cement floors, which allow the animal waste 
to collect in holding areas under the buildings.28 Animal waste is 
abundant in these types of operations: one dairy farm with 2,500 
cows produces as much waste as a city with around 411,000 resi-
dents.29  
Depending on the design of the CAFO, waste is either left in the 
pit beneath the building for months or flushed out with water 
                                                                                                         
 23  See Lindsay Walton & Kristen King Jaiven, Regulating Concentrated An-
imal Feeding Operations for the Well-Being of Farm Animals, Consumers, and 
the Environment, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW? 89, 93 (Randall Abate ed., 2015).  
 24  Ellen K. Silbergeld et al., Industrial Food Animal Production, Antimicro-
bial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 151, 161–63 
(2008); David Tillman et al., Agricultural Sustainability and Intensive Production 
Practices, 418 NATURE 671, 674 (2002).  
 25  See, e.g., Carole Levine, Environmental Justice or Environmental Racism: 
Something Smells in North Carolina, NPQ (June 7, 2018), https://nonprofitquar-
terly.org/2018/06/07/environmental-justice-or-environmental-racism-something-
smells-in-north-carolina/; Steve Wing & Susanne Wolf, Intensive Livestock Op-
erations, Health, and Quality of Life Among Eastern North Carolina Residents, 
108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 233, 235–37 (2000). 
 26  See John Verheul, Student Article, Methane as a Greenhouse Gas: Why 
the EPA Should Regulate Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations and Con-
centrated Animal Feeding Operations Under the Clean Air Act, 51 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 163, 168 (2011). 
 27  Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Envi-
ronmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 797, 809 (2005). 
 28  Id. at 808–09. 
 29  EDWIN BARTH ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT 
EVALUATION FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 7 (John Haines 
& Laurel Staley eds., 2004).  
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throughout the day.30 Because it can be difficult for land to absorb 
such high concentrations of animal waste, the waste on CAFOs is 
instead pumped into open-air retention ponds, known as waste stor-
age lagoons, some of which can be as large as eight acres.31 Liquid 
manure is stored in lagoons until land becomes available on which 
to spread the waste.32 “When manure is left as a solid . . . on . . . pas-
ture lands, it typically decomposes aerobically and produces little to 
no methane.”33 However, when waste is stored or handled in a sys-
tem that creates an anaerobic environment, such as the lagoons, the 
waste releases amounts of methane that are as much as ninety per-
cent (90%) higher than those in grazing systems.34 
Ruminant production is the largest source of global anthropo-
genic methane emissions and is responsible for 25.9% of methane 
emissions in the United States.35 Ruminant animals are herbivores 
that digest their food through the process of enteric fermentation in 
a multi-chambered stomach.36 Cows and sheep are the highest pro-
duced ruminants in the United States.37 Methane is produced as a 
                                                                                                         
 30  See CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDER-
STANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
COMMUNITIES 3 (Mark Schultz ed., 2010). 
 31  See ROBBIN MARKS, NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL AND THE 
CLEAN WATER NETWORK CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS 
AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 36 (2001).  
 32  See id. While waste absorbed on land does not emit as many greenhouse 
gases, it often leads to a host of other environmental concerns—namely the con-
tamination of groundwater, the spread of airborne diseases, and noxious fumes 
that disproportionately affect the poor communities surrounding CAFOs. See 
DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOS UNCOV-
ERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 3–5 
(2008).  
 33  Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,855. 
 34  Paul Jun et al., CH4 and N2O Emissions from Livestock Manure, in NAT’L 
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES PROGRAMME, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, BACKGROUND PAPERS – IPCC EXPERT MEETINGS ON GOOD 
PRACTICE GUIDANCE AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT IN NAT’L GREENHOUSE 
GAS INVENTORIES 321, 338 tbl.10 (Buendia et al. eds., 2002).  
 35  Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2. Enteric fermentation (which results from 
ruminant production) is responsible for 25.9% of methane emissions in the United 
States. EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21. 
 36  Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
 37  Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,847. 
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by-product of microbial digestive processes in these animals, and is 
released through belching and breathing.38  
It is estimated that there are more than 18,000 CAFOs and 
450,000 AFOs in the United States.39 Unsurprisingly, these indus-
trial facilities emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases like me-
thane and nitrous oxide.40 Greenhouse gases absorb infrared radia-
tion from the sun as it reflects off the Earth’s surface, trapping the 
heat in the atmosphere.41 Human activities increased the concentra-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing 
global climate change.42 
Greenhouse gases vary in their warming influence on the climate 
system due to their different radiative properties and lifetimes in the 
atmosphere.43 These warming influences are often expressed 
through a common metric based on the radiative property of carbon 
dioxide.44 Therefore, while carbon dioxide may be the most preva-
lent of the greenhouse gases, and often the focus of climate change 
concern, it is by no means the most potent gas.45 Illustratively, ni-
trous oxide has a global warming potential 265–298 times that of 
carbon dioxide on a 100-year frame.46 Nitrous oxide emissions will 
                                                                                                         
 38  Id.; Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
 39  RICHARD JONES ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT NO. 17-P-
0396, ELEVEN YEARS AFTER AGREEMENT, EPA HAS NOT DEVELOPED RELIABLE 
EMISSION ESTIMATION METHODS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANIMAL FEEDING OP-
ERATIONS COMPLY WITH CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER STATUTES 1 (2017). 
 40  See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21. 
 41 Glossary of Climate Change Terms, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary-climate-change-
terms_.html#G (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (definitions of “Greenhouse Effect” 
and “Greenhouse Gas (GHG)”).  
 42  See 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 6, at 36. 
 43  Id.  
 44  Id. 
 45  Ripple et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
 46  Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Understanding Global Warming Potentials, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/under-
standing-global-warming-potentials (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Un-
derstanding Global Warming Potentials]; see also Carbon Brief & Duncan Clark, 
How Long Do Greenhouse Gases Stay in the Air?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2012, 2:00 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-
remain-air [hereinafter Greenhouse Gases]. 
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also be the primary cause of stratospheric ozone destruction this cen-
tury.47 Similarly damaging, methane has a global warming potential 
that is 28–36 times that of carbon dioxide over a 100-year frame.48 
Further, the atmospheric lifespan of methane and nitrous oxide is 
about 12 years and about 114 years respectively, compared to the 
20–200 year lifespan of carbon dioxide.49 Therefore, decreasing me-
thane and nitrous oxide, rather than carbon dioxide, will potentially 
result in more rapid reductions in climate forcing.50  
According to the EPA’s national greenhouse gas emissions an-
nual inventory, agriculture represents 8.6% of the nation’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions and 76.7% of its nitrous oxide emis-
sions.51 Additionally, the EPA states that methane emissions from 
enteric fermentation and manure management represent 25.9% and 
10.3% of total methane emissions, respectively.52 Methane and ni-
trous oxide compose 10% and 6%, respectively, of total greenhouse 
gas emissions in the United States.53 Undeniably, animal agricul-
ture, representing less than 1% of the national GDP, contributes sig-
nificantly to climate change.54  
The modern structure of the livestock industry, specifically the 
current waste storage system, is responsible for animal agriculture’s 
                                                                                                         
 47  See R. W. Portmann et al., Stratospheric Ozone Depletion Due to Nitrous 
Oxide: Influences of Other Gases, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 
1256, 1263 (2012). 
 48  Understanding Global Warming Potentials, supra note 46. 
 49  Greenhouse Gases, supra note 46. 
 50  Id. Climate forcing is defined as “the change in radiant energy retained by 
Earth owing to emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases.” Ripple et al., supra 
note 3, at 2. 
 51  EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at 5-1.   
 52  Id.   
 53  Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (last visited Dec. 
29, 2018). 
 54  According to the Economic Research Service, the output of America’s 
farms contributed about one percent (1%) of GDP. Because animal agriculture, is 
only a percentage of this total farm output, its contribution to the GDP would be 
less than one percent (1%). See Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-
and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-econ-
omy/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). For the full report, see ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NO. 078, AG AND FOOD STATISTICS: CHARTING THE ES-
SENTIALS, OCTOBER 2017 (2017). 
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disproportionate contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. Confin-
ing liquid waste in open-air lagoons promotes the decomposition of 
livestock manure under anaerobic conditions, which accelerates the 
production of methane.55 Furthermore, these waste lagoons contrib-
ute to nitrous oxide emissions by facilitating the nitrification-deni-
trification process: “Nitrification occurs aerobically and converts 
[the nitrogen in manure, ammonia,] into nitrate, while denitrification 
occurs anaerobically, and converts the nitrate to [nitrous oxide].”56 
In 2016, the total agricultural emissions of primarily carbon di-
oxide, nitrous oxide, and methane in the United States amounted to 
about 560 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.57 The 
alarming amount of emissions from CAFOs amidst the rising con-
cerns of climate change’s deleterious global effects demand height-
ened environmental regulations at the federal level under the CAA. 
II. ESTABLISHING THE EPA’S AUTHORITY OVER CAFOS UNDER 
THE CAA 
A. An Introduction: The EPA and the CAA 
Since its adoption in 1963, the CAA has been implemented by 
the United States government for the regulation of airborne pollu-
tants.58 The CAA is administered by the EPA, the federal agency 
tasked with the enforcement and implementation of federal environ-
mental statutes.59 Under the CAA, the EPA can use an endanger-
ment finding to classify a specific substance as a “pollutant” once 
scientific evidence is presented concerning the substance’s harmful 
                                                                                                         
 55  See Jun et al., supra note 34, at 322.  
 56  Id. at 323. 
 57  EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at 5-1. 
 58  Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
 59  See Overview of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13. 
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effects.60 Subsequently upon classification, the EPA is able to regu-
late the pollutant’s release into the atmosphere.61 In effect, the EPA 
establishes threshold emission standards under the CAA for regu-
lated entities.  
As this Note explains, the EPA is empowered to use the CAA to 
regulate greenhouse gases.62 Consequently, the EPA classified me-
thane and nitrous oxide as pollutants.63 As large emitters of these 
gases, CAFOs should be subject to CAA regulations because federal 
oversight by the EPA would allow for the establishment of a na-
tional threshold emission standard for these livestock facilities. 
While relying on states’ air pollution statutes may provide localized 
standards that will undoubtedly help climate change mitigation ef-
forts, it could nevertheless instigate a race to the bottom among cor-
porate farms, who may decide to move their CAFOs to states with 
more lenient emission regulations. 
The EPA regulates carbon-based emissions from cars, coal-fired 
power plants, and other greenhouse gas emitters under the CAA by 
establishing a national standard for mitigating the industries’ pro-
duction of greenhouse gases.64 The EPA needs to similarly hold the 
animal agriculture industry accountable by enforcing the existing 
CAA framework against CAFOs in order to ensure a decrease in 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions across the livestock sector. The 
EPA has the power through the CAA to implement a national green-
house gas emission threshold for the animal agriculture industry, en-
suring compliance by all CAFOs in the United States.  
                                                                                                         
 60  The CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate “air pollution which may reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
Through this expressed authority from Congress, the EPA is able to issue endan-
germent findings supported by scientific evidence. For a climate-specific expla-
nation of the EPA’s regulatory authority to initiate endangerment findings under 
the CAA see, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, EPA’S ENDANGERMENT FINDING: THE 
LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE ACTION (2017). 
 61  See Verheul, supra note 26, at 165. 
 62  See infra Section III.C. 
 63  John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Way for Greenhouse Gas Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/earth/18endan-
ger.html.  
 64  See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
506, 532 (2007) (determining that “greenhouse gases fit well within the [CAA]’s 
capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’” thus granting the EPA authority to regu-
late carbon-based emissions from various sources).   
2019] MANURE MANAGEMENT FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 543 
B. The Regulatory Framework 
The EPA has yet to issue formalized regulations specifically ad-
dressing CAFO emissions of methane and nitrous oxide. Thus, rely-
ing on the existing CAA framework is paramount.65 No efforts have 
been made by the EPA to pass explicit air standards for CAFOs, and 
experts suggest regulations tailored specifically to CAFO green-
house gas emissions are unlikely.66 In fact, explicit federal regula-
tion aimed at protecting environmental quality from CAFO produc-
tion only concerns the facilities’ impacts on water resources.67 The 
improper storage of animal waste “can harm water quality through 
surface runoff, direct discharges, spills, and leaching into soil and 
groundwater.”68 While environmental regulations of CAFOs can be 
seen explicitly carved out in the CWA, the little leverage the act 
provides has been difficult to successfully solidify.69  
The CWA authorizes the EPA to directly regulate the discharge 
of a pollutant from any point source by requiring such a source to 
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(“NPDES”) permit.70 In 2003, the EPA attempted to issue specific 
effluent limitation guidelines for CAFOs,71 which required an 
NPDES permit application unless the facility demonstrated there 
was no potential for discharge.72 However, the Second Circuit struck 
                                                                                                         
 65  Bruce Myers & Linda Breggin, Tackling the Problem of CAFOs and Cli-
mate Change: A New Path to Improved Animal Welfare?, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL 
LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 117, 130–31 (Randall S. Abate ed., 
2015). 
 66  Id. 
 67  AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 2.  
 68  Id. 
 69  See Verheul, supra note 26, at 165. 
 70  40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (2018) (concerning calculation of NPDES permit con-
ditions).   
 71  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123 & 412). 
 72  Id. at 7202–03 (“[A]n unpermitted CAFO that does in fact discharge pol-
lutants to waters of the U.S., with or without a determination of ‘no potential to 
discharge,’ would be in violation of the Clean Water Act.”) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.23(d)(1)–(2) (2003), invalidated by Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 
486, 505 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
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down the 2003 rule’s mandatory permit requirement because it ex-
tended beyond the statutory scope of the CWA, which merely au-
thorizes, rather than mandates, the EPA to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants.73 Following the decision, the EPA revised their rule with 
more lenient requirements.74 Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, this revised rule was similarly struck down by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, because imposing liability for facilities merely proposing to 
discharge pollutants would still be an unlawful extension of the 
CWA.75 Both cases emphasize the EPA’s limited authority to regu-
late CAFOs through the CWA.76  
These CWA decisions will not pose problems for CAFO regu-
lation through the CAA because the CAA provides a number of reg-
ulatory tools to address air pollution problems created by CAFOs 
through an already existing framework. As statutes, the CWA and 
the CAA are similar in their grant of authority because they both 
empower the EPA to set threshold standards for pollutant emis-
sions.77 However, in both the CWA cases discussed above, the 
courts’ issue surrounded the EPA’s proposed rules, which expanded 
                                                                                                         
 73  Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 505 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 
F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 74  Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regula-
tion and Effluent Limitation Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Oper-
ations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,427 
(Nov. 20, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 412) (“EPA is requiring 
CAFOs to seek permit coverage if they discharge or propose to discharge pollu-
tants . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 75  Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he EPA’s authority is limited to the regulation of CAFOs that discharge.”).   
 76  National Pork Producers Council relied heavily on the analysis presented 
in Waterkeeper, and ultimately struck down the requirement provision of the re-
vised rule under a similar analysis: “Because the issues presented in Waterkeeper 
are similar to the issues presented here, we find the Second Circuit analysis to be 
instructive and persuasive.” Id. at 750. “These cases leave no doubt that there must 
be an actual discharge into navigable waters to trigger the CWA’s requirements 
and the EPA’s authority.” Id. at 751. 
 77  Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, from Nixon to 
Trump, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive 
/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-
trump/521001/ (describing how both the CAA and the CWA give the EPA au-
thority to set standards for “what kinds of toxic air pollutants can be released” and 
“what pollutants can be released into lakes, streams, and rivers”).  
2019] MANURE MANAGEMENT FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 545 
the scope of the CWA unlawfully.78 Here, adequately regulating 
CAFOs’ emissions of greenhouse gases would not require an expan-
sion of already delineated authority. The CAA can be utilized to em-
power the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs 
through sections 108, 109, and 111 of the statute.79 Most signifi-
cantly, the EPA can use the existing CAA provisions to regulate 
CAFO emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, ultimately creating 
a national framework by setting an emission threshold for all CAFO 
facilities nationwide.  
C. Greenhouse Gases Under the CAA 
The CAA, originally enacted in 1963 but further developed in 
subsequent amendments, regulates ambient air quality, stationary 
mobile source emissions, and hazardous air pollutants through the 
administration of permits.80 The CAA establishes two provisions 
under which the EPA may grant permits: (1) the preconstruction per-
mits, known as New Source Review, under Title I, Parts C and D, 
and (2) the operating permit under Title V.81 Through these provi-
sions, the EPA is able to provide permits for polluters, and thus re-
quire a threshold emission standard.82  
                                                                                                         
 78  See Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 749, 751; Waterkeeper, 399 
F.3d at 506, 519, 524. 
 79  See infra Part IV. 
 80  See Clean Air Act Overview: Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-
clean-air-act (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). 
 81  42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503, 7661 (2012); see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW (NSR) (2015),  https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2015-12/documents/nsrbasicsfactsheet103106.pdf [hereinafter 
FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW]. 
 82  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503, 7661; CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL33632, CLEAN AIR PERMITTING: IMPLEMENTATION AND ISSUES 
1 (2016) [hereinafter CLEAN AIR PERMITTING] (describing Congress’ intent in 
adopting the operating permit programs, which includes the “clarification of pol-
lution control requirements, simplification of procedures for modifying a source’s 
control obligations, . . . and enhancing states’ ability to administer other signifi-
cant CAA responsibilities”); FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW, supra note 81 
(“New Source Review . . . requires industrial facilities to install modern pollution 
control equipment when they are built or when making a change that increases 
emissions significantly,” by requiring owners and operators to obtain permits 
“limiting air emissions before they begin construction”). 
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The preconstruction permit provision applies to new sources or 
the modification of existing sources that emit a threshold level of 
pollutants.83 The Title V Operating Permits Program created 
through the 1990 CAA amendments, expanded the number of 
sources requiring federal permits by “stipulating that all major pol-
lution sources and other designated sources must obtain operating 
permits . . . to ensure compliance with the CAA.”84 Prior to the 1990 
amendments, existing sources would require permits only if they 
were subsequently modified and increased their air emissions.85 
This is significant in the CAFO context because pursuant to the 1990 
amendments, existing CAFOs—not just new or modified facili-
ties—could be subject to CAA permits. 
At the time of the CAA’s initial drafting, climate change was not 
the environmental movement’s top policy priority. However, as the 
Supreme Court identified in Massachusetts v. EPA, the landmark 
2007 decision affirming the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse 
gases, “[w]hile the Congresses that drafted [the CAA] might not 
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead 
to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flex-
ibility, changing circumstances . . . would soon render the . . . Act 
obsolete.”86 Therefore, despite the Act’s expansion and develop-
ment across the years, the statute has maintained a flexibility that 
welcomes interconnections between its provisions to create new pol-
icy regimes.  
In Massachusetts, the Court determined unambiguously that 
greenhouse gases can be air pollutants under the CAA.87 In its hold-
ing, the Court ordered the EPA to determine whether emissions of 
greenhouse gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger pub-
lic health or welfare.”88 In 2009, the EPA administrator issued its 
endangerment finding asserting that the current and projected con-
                                                                                                         
 83  42 U.S.C. § 7475; FACT SHEET: NEW SOURCE REVIEW, supra note 81. 
 84  CLEAN AIR PERMITTING, supra note 82, at 1. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
 87  Id. (“Because greenhouse gases fit well within the [CAA’s] capacious def-
inition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 
the emission of such gases . . . .”).  
 88  Id. at 532–33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).  
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centrations of greenhouse gases—including methane and nitrous ox-
ide—threaten existing and future generations.89 The final rule was 
published in the federal register at the end of 2009 and made effec-
tive in 2010.90 An endangerment finding is a prerequisite for the ap-
plicability of most sections of the CAA.91 The EPA thus has the au-
thority to list and regulate methane and nitrous oxide as pollutants 
under the CAA.92  
However, agricultural operations have long been exempt from 
many provisions of environmental laws, and it may appear that reg-
ulating CAFO air emissions through the CAA may fall through a 
similar loophole.93 Following “the first Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933, Congress and the courts . . . built a safety net of statutory 
exclusions and economic subsidies”94 to support industrialized ani-
mal production, a practice known as “agricultural exceptional-
ism.”95 Agricultural exceptionalism is premised on the idea that the 
                                                                                                         
 89  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (“The Administrator finds that the air pollution is the combined mix of six 
key directly-emitted, long-lived and well-mixed greenhouse gases . . . , which 
together, constitute the root cause of human-induced climate change . . . . These 
six greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocar-
bons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.”); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE 
FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-
findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
 90  See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,546. 
 91  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).  
 92  Pursuant to the finding, the EPA must list all six greenhouse gases as pol-
lutants under preconstruction and operating permit requirements as well as issue 
air quality criteria for each of the greenhouse gases identified in the endangerment 
finding within 12 months of listing them. Id. § 7408(a)(1)–(2).  
 93  See, e.g., Kael K. Bowling, Old MacDonald Had a Right to Farm: Putting 
a Humane Twist on Missouri’s Right-to-Farm Amendment, 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. 
L. 137, 139 (2017); Jason Foscolo & Michael Zimmerman, Alternative Growth: 
Forsaking the False Economies of Industrial Agriculture, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 316, 321–27 (2014).  
 94  Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316. 
 95  “Agriculture receives many exceptions or exemptions in labor, bankruptcy, 
and antitrust laws.” Bowling, supra note 93, at 139. Federal insurance programs 
cover crop losses due to natural disasters, and farmers have their own bankruptcy 
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importance of food for human survival should entitle the agriculture 
industry to a “special legal and regulatory advantage.”96 Born along-
side the modern environmental movement, agricultural exceptional-
ism has lead policymakers to concede to agricultural interest against 
competing environmental concerns, which has riddled federal envi-
ronmental statutes with multiple farm and agriculture related con-
cessions.97  
An example of such a carve-out includes the farm exemptions 
that perforate the CWA’s prohibition against discharge pollutants. 
Although agricultural waste directly discharged into water is a pol-
lutant under the CWA,98 “other provisions of the statute put dis-
charges of agricultural wastewater, stormwater, and fill material 
largely beyond regulatory reach.”99 In the context of mitigating cli-
mate change through the regulation of CAFOs’ greenhouse gas 
emissions, farms do not benefit from any express exemptions in the 
CAA like they do under the CWA.100 Nevertheless, in practice, 
agreements between the EPA and the livestock sector may poten-
tially allow CAFOs to bypass CAA regulations with regards to 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
                                                                                                         
code. Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316–17. Further, the agriculture 
sector is exempt from anti-trust laws in the Capper-Volstead Act. Id. 
 96  Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 316; see Susan A. Schneider, A 
Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and 
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010).  
 97  Foscolo & Zimmerman, supra note 93, at 317 (“Yet rather than reach a 
middle ground that balanced agriculture and environmental conservation, policy-
makers largely yielded to agricultural exceptionalism—nearly every major federal 
environmental statute passed since the 1970s has included carve-outs for farms.”). 
Congress, and states following the federal government’s example, have largely 
prevented the intersection of environmental regulation onto farming practices: 
“farms remained largely unburdened by environmental law, yet move steadily up 
the ranks of the worst threats to the environment.” J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Envi-
ronmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 267–68 
(2000). 
 98  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).  
 99  See Ruhl, supra note 97, at 293–94.  
 100  Id. at 305. 
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D. Potential Barriers to the EPA’s Authority:  
The Air Compliance Agreement 
A potential impediment to the EPA’s authority over CAFOs via 
CAA regulations is the Air Compliance Agreement, under which the 
EPA compromised some of its ability to regulate animal agriculture 
from 2005 onward.101 This Agreement allowed the EPA to provide 
CAFOs and AFOs temporary immunity from civil liability under the 
CAA’s permit provisions—Title I, Parts C and D, and Title V—in 
exchange for CAFOs allowing the EPA to monitor emissions at se-
lected facilities.102 The immunity would extend as long as the mon-
itoring study was in place and would protect CAFOs from being 
held liable for violations of the CAA, the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(“EPCRA”).103  
While the Air Compliance Agreement created an immunity ra-
ther than an exemption, the Agreement provided a “sweeping liabil-
ity shield for violations of environmental laws,” which made regu-
lation of CAFOs who signed the agreement impossible.104 Of the 
nearly 2,681 CAFOs that signed agreements with the EPA, only 
twenty-five were selected to participate in monitoring, but all who 
signed up were protected by the EPA’s covenant not to sue.105 With-
out the power to civilly sue CAFOs, the EPA would not be able to 
enforce regulations unless there was a criminal violation.106 Further, 
“hindered by a lack of adequate, accurate, scientifically credible 
data,” the EPA argued it could not establish emission thresholds for 
its permits, thus leaving the industry without a standard to even po-
tentially violate.107  
                                                                                                         
 101  Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005). 
 102  Id. at 4963. Paragraph 26 details the EPA’s release of covenants not to sue 
with respect to certain Emission Units located at participating farms. Id. 
 103  Id. at 4962 (“[T]his agreement resolves Respondent’s civil liability for cer-
tain potential violations of the [CAA], CERCLA and/or EPCRA at [Participating 
Company’s] Farm(s) . . . .”). 
 104  AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at Summary. 
 105  See id. at 4, 7, 10. 
 106  Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra 
note 101, at 4958–59.  
 107  AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 3. 
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The goal of the Agreement, therefore, was in part “to generate 
scientifically credible data to provide for the characterization of 
emissions from all major types of AFOs.”108  Enforcement of federal 
environmental laws, including the CAA, requires accurate measure-
ment of emissions to determine whether regulated pollutants are 
emitted in quantities that exceed specified thresholds.109 The EPA, 
however, believed that existing data provided a poor basis for regu-
lating and managing air emissions from CAFOs.110  
Environmentalists, along with state and local air quality offi-
cials, criticized the Agreement, contending that it would unfairly 
shield participating producers while placing thousands of communi-
ties at risk.111 Further, because only twenty-five farms in ten states 
would be monitored, critics argued that it was too limited in scope 
to satisfy its objective of determining scientifically credible emis-
sion estimates.112 A legal challenge to the Air Compliance Agree-
ment was brought by several environmental groups, although it was 
dismissed when the D.C. Circuit held that the agreements constitute 
discretionary agency action not reviewable by the court.113 Further, 
three years after initiating the study, it was still unclear whether the 
EPA would acquire the necessary information to develop emission 
protocols because the monitoring study did not include the recom-
mended animal and geographic regional pairings or provide an ade-
quate sample size.114 
                                                                                                         
 108  Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra 
note 101, at 4960.  
 109  See id. (“The purpose of the monitoring study is to: collect data and aggre-
gate it with appropriate existing emissions data; analyze the monitoring results; 
and create tools . . . that AFOs could use to determine whether they emit pollutants 
at levels that require them to apply for permits under the CAA or submit notifica-
tions under CERCLA or EPCRA.”).  
 110  See AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 3. 
 111  John Heilprin, Environmentalists Blast Agriculture Plan, MRT (May 5, 
2003, 7:00 PM), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/Environmentalists-Blast-Ag-
riculture-Plan-7918515.php. 
 112  AIR QUALITY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 7. 
 113  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030–31 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (stating that the “analysis of this case begins and ends with subject matter 
jurisdiction”). 
 114  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944, CONCENTRATED AN-
IMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY 
DEFINED STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR AND WATER QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS 
OF CONCERN 1, 37–39 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08944.pdf.  
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Despite providing a “safe harbor” provision from civil enforce-
ment of permitting requirements under the CAA, the EPA retained 
the authority to criminally prosecute CAFOs and respond to immi-
nent and substantial endangerments to public health or the environ-
ment.115 Moreover, the Agreement only specifically exempted 
CAFOs from civil violations from volatile organic compounds 
(“VOCs”),116 hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, and ammonia.117 
The language in the Agreement explicitly states that the EPA’s re-
leases and covenant not to sue do not extend to emissions of gases 
beyond the four named.118 Importantly, none of the four named 
gases are greenhouse gases; therefore, it is clear that methane, car-
bon dioxide, and nitrous oxide were not contemplated in the Agree-
ment.  
As the EPA did not cede its ability to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from the livestock industry, the EPA would not be barred 
from enforcing the provisions of the CAA against CAFOs with re-
gards to greenhouse gas emissions. Having established the EPA’s 
authority under the CAA, this Note will now determine the most 
effective provisions of the Act for regulating CAFOs in order to mit-
igate climate change.   
III. CAA ENFORCEMENT IN PRACTICE 
As emitters of greenhouse gases, CAFOs could fall under the 
CAA’s stationary source regulations. Under these regulations, miti-
gating greenhouse gas emissions from CAFOs can be best achieved 
via two portions of the Act: (1) emission-based standards through 
the criteria pollutants provisions in sections 108 and 109 of the Act; 
                                                                                                         
 115  Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra 
note 101, at 4958–4959. 
 116  The EPA defines VOCs as “any compound of carbon, excluding carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and 
ammonium carbonate, which participates in atmospheric photochemical reac-
tions,” except those designated by the EPA as having “negligible photochemical 
reactivity.” 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s)(1) (2018). 
 117  Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra 
note 101, at 4963 (explicitly only including VOCs, hydrogen sulfide, particulate 
matter, and ammonia in its definition of “Emission Unit”). 
 118  Id.  
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and (2) individual source standards under the New Source Perfor-
mance Standards (“NSPS”) of section 111.119 Section 112 of the 
CAA, another stationary source regulation, is inapplicable to green-
house gases because it empowers the EPA to regulate hazardous pol-
lutants deemed “toxic.”120  
Sections 108 and 109 set limits for acceptable pollutant concen-
trations in the air, while section 111 sets limits for those concentra-
tions at individual stationary sources.121 However, section 111 offers 
the most complete answer to the CAFO greenhouse gas emissions 
problem because the EPA can reasonably read section 111(d) to ap-
ply broadly to both new and existing sources of greenhouse gases. 
Sections 108 and 109 are trickier to apply to CAFOs because of their 
reliance on regional concentrations of pollutants.122  
A. Criteria Pollutant Provisions 
Sections 108 and 109 of the CAA govern the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), which specify the maximum 
permissible concentration of an air pollutant in a region’s ambient 
air.123 Once the EPA has created the required endangerment finding 
for a pollutant, “there is no discretion provided by the statute not to 
list the pollutant.”124 After the EPA sets a NAAQS limit, each state 
develops State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) detailing how the 
state’s air quality control regions will comply with the standard.125  
                                                                                                         
 119  42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409, 7411 (2012). 
 120  Id. § 7412(b)(2) (listing established hazardous pollutants determined by 
Congress and reviewed by the EPA administrator). 
 121  Id. §§ 7408–7409, 7411. 
 122  After the EPA revises National Ambient Air Quality Standards under sec-
tions 108 and 109 of the CAA, state and local governments are responsible for 
developing and implementing plans to monitor air quality in their respective re-
gions. Id. § 7410; see NAAQS Implementation Process, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-implementation-pro-
cess (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). For an example of one of these plans, see Air 
Plan Approval; Tennessee; NOx SIP Call and CAIR, 83 Fed. Reg. 64,497, 64,497 
(proposed Dec. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 123  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)–(2). 
 124  Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 125  42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
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Some CAFO emissions are already regulated under sections 108 
and 109; there is a NAAQS for particulate matter126 and the EPA 
has the authority to regulate ammonia as a precursor to particulate 
matter.127 NAAQS implementation works best for localized emis-
sions because the permitting structure assesses ambient air locally 
through air quality control regions.128 This presents problems for 
greenhouse gas regulations because greenhouse gases disperse 
throughout the globe upon release into the atmosphere. Greenhouse 
gases are often classified as “‘well-mixed,’ meaning their concen-
tration is similar around the world regardless of where the emissions 
arise.”129 For this reason, regulating CAFO emissions of methane 
and nitrous oxide under the NAAQS/SIPs program becomes prob-
lematic because in order to set a limit, there needs to be a quantifia-
ble regional concentration.  
Moreover, explicitly applying NAAQS to greenhouse gases is 
an overreach of agency authority according to the Supreme Court in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (“UARG”).130 In a 2010 regu-
lation, the EPA attempted to explicitly apply NAAQS to greenhouse 
gases.131 The EPA planned to tailor its program based on specific 
greenhouse gas emissions by adopting a “phase-in approach” that 
would apply Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) to 
large industrial sources at greenhouse gas threshold levels that are 
                                                                                                         
 126  The most recent set of NAAQS for particulate matter was promulgated in 
2013. Particulate Matter (PM) Standards – Table of Historical PM NAAQS, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm 
/s_pm_history.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018); see National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 52, 53 & 58). 
 127  J. Nicholas Hoover, Note, Can’t You Smell That Smell? Clean Air Act Fixes 
for Factory Farm Air Pollution, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2013). 
 128  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d), 7410. 
 129  NAAQS May Help EPA Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions, Should 
Clean Power Plan Not Survive Challenges, DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y 
SOLUTIONS: NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/articles/naaqs 
-may-help-epa-achieve-greenhouse-gas-reductions-should-clean-power-plan-
not-survive. 
 130  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014). 
 131  The regulation seeks to tailor “the applicability criteria that determine 
which [greenhouse gas] . . . sources become subject to the [Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deterioration] and title V programs of the CAA.” Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 
31,516 (June 3, 2010).  
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as “close to the [CAA’s] statutory levels as possible.”132 The PSD 
program applies to areas that are in attainment of NAAQS in order 
to ensure that new major sources or new modifications do not 
worsen areas that currently have acceptable air quality.133  
Despite the EPA believing the CAA was not “ambiguous with 
respect to the need to cover [greenhouse gas] sources under the PSD 
program,”134 UARG held that the agency had exceeded its reach un-
der the CAA.135 According to the Court, while Massachusetts held 
that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse 
gases, the term “air pollutant” in PSD permitting provisions has rou-
tinely been given a narrow, “context-appropriate” meaning.136 In 
sum, Massachusetts does not override narrow definitions of “air pol-
lutant” found in discrete provisions of the CAA.137 According to the 
Court, the EPA cannot  “treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for 
purposes of defining a ‘major emitting facility’”— such as a 
CAFO—in the PSD context.138  
Following UARG, in 2015, the D.C. Circuit issued an amended 
decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, which or-
dered the EPA’s proposed regulation vacated to the extent it requires 
a stationary emitter to obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are 
the only pollutant.139 For CAFOs, this means greenhouse gas regu-
lation under sections 108 and 109 is only possible for facilities large 
enough to produce pollutants that would trigger NAAQS regulation 
for particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, or other gases 
explicitly covered.140 As operations become larger, it becomes more 
                                                                                                         
 132  Id. at 31,523. 
 133  40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2018). 
 134  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tai-
loring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,548 n.31. 
 135  Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 143 S. Ct. at 2445. 
 136  Id. at 2439. 
 137  Id. at 2440–41. 
 138  Id. at 2449. 
 139  Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6, 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015). 
 140  As previously discussed, the EPA has already issued NAAQS for particu-
late matter, which CAFOs do emit. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 52, 53 & 58). Therefore, greenhouse gas regulation of CAFO 
emissions is possible for facilities large enough to trigger particulate matter 
NAAQS. 
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likely that some operations meet the emission thresholds for major 
sources. Regardless, seeking to regulate CAFOs’ greenhouse gas 
emissions through this provision could only occur indirectly and is 
thus not necessarily the ideal method for mitigating emissions.  
B. New and Existing Source Performance Standards 
The second regulatory pathway for CAFOs under the CAA fo-
cuses on individual sources of emissions. Under section 111 of the 
CAA, the EPA may regulate the various pollutants emitted from a 
single source category.141 When listing a category, the EPA must 
make an endangerment finding142 and then promulgate performance 
standards for new sources in the category.143 These performance 
standards, unlike NAAQS, are not pollutant specific, but category 
specific.144 The EPA has broad power to define and revise source 
categories of pollution and has listed a large number of such catego-
ries in the Code of Federal Regulations.145 Unfortunately, CAFOs 
have not yet been listed.146 
Section 111’s New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) 
cap the level of achievable emissions by the best system of emission 
reduction (“BSER”) for all regulated pollutants as determined by the 
EPA administrator.147 Following an identification of the BSER, the 
Agency must then set performance standards, usually expressed as 
emission rates based on the emissions performance the EPA be-
lieves can be achieved through application of its identified sys-
tem.148 The performance standard determines the stringency of the 
                                                                                                         
 141  42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (indicating that sources are to be regu-
lated, not pollutants). 
 142  Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (“[The Administrator] shall include a category of 
sources in such list if in his judgement it causes, or contributes significantly to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”). 
 143  Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B). 
 144  See id. (“The Administrator shall publish proposed regulations, establish-
ing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such category.”). 
 145  40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018) (including emission guidelines for Large Municipal 
Waste Combustors, Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, Infectious Waste Incinera-
tors, etc.).  
 146  Id.; see infra Section III.C. 
 147 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
 148  See id. § 7411(a), (d); see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 
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regulation.149 However, as clarified by section 111(b)(5), “nothing 
in this section shall be construed to require . . . any . . . source to 
install and operate any particular technological system . . . to comply 
with any new source standard of performance.”150 This offers a tre-
mendous amount of flexibility to regulated entities, who are free to 
adopt any measure so long as they meet emission standards.   
Section 111(b) was issued as a NSPS, generally implying that 
existing, unmodified stationary emission sources are not subject to 
performance standards under this section.151 While being con-
structed, these unmodified sources must comply with NSPS but are 
not required to meet future performance standards.152 This is the 
case because many emissions from existing sources are regulated by 
the NAAQS programs in sections 108 and 109, or the hazardous air 
pollutant program in section 112 of the CAA. However, not every 
air pollutant is either a criteria pollutant with corresponding 
NAAQS or hazardous pollutants subject to compliance with section 
112. For such pollutants, section 111(d) of the CAA provides a 
mechanism for implementing existing emissions performance 
standards (“ESPS”).153  
Section 111(d) has only very rarely been used, largely because 
there are few pollutants with significant health or welfare impacts 
that have not been regulated under NAAQS or section 112.154 How-
ever, greenhouse gases conveniently fall into this regulatory gap. 
Under section 111(d), the EPA can require states to submit plans for 
establishing, implementing, and enforcing standards for existing 
                                                                                                         
64,662, 64,664 n.1 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“Under 
CAA section 111(a)(1) and (d), the EPA is authorized to determine the BSER and 
to calculate the amount of emission reduction achievable through applying the 
BSER.”). 
 149  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). 
 150  Id. § 7411(b)(5). 
 151  Id. § 7411(b)(6) (“Any new or modified fossil fuel fired stationary source 
which commences construction prior to the date of publication of the proposed 
revised standards shall not be required to comply with such revised standards.”). 
 152  Id.  
 153  Id. § 7411(d). 
 154  Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of CO2 Emissions from 
Existing Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: Program Design & 
Statutory Authority, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,366, 10,372–73 (2014) (noting that cri-
teria and toxic pollutants are “two categories that encompass the vast majority of 
known air pollutants”). 
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sources, provided that the pollutants already have a standard of per-
formance for new stationary sources and are not covered by any 
other provision of the CAA.155 Prior to approving a state’s plan, the 
agency must set national goals that each individual state’s plan must 
achieve.156 The EPA essentially indicates the substantive guidelines 
for state plans, which effectively set the minimum stringency of the 
ESPS.157 
The EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases under 111(d), 
however, has come under scrutiny with opponents claiming it as an 
overreach of agency power.158 Thus far, the EPA’s only effort to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the ESPS program is re-
flected in its proposed rules for power plants, which would create a 
new source performance standard for carbon dioxide emissions for 
coal-fired power facilities.159 This is most notably seen in the 
Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. Obama’s EPA, through 
the Clean Power Plan, sought to establish state-specific emission 
rate-based goals that would be implemented under section 111(d) to 
curb carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning plants.160  
A close reading of section 111(d) indicates that the “any existing 
source for any air pollutant” language of the provision can be read 
                                                                                                         
 155  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). 
 156  Id. 
 157  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.22–.23 (2018). 
 158  See William Yeatman, Primer: The Ongoing Controversy over Whether 
Clean Air Act §111(d) Authorizes EPA’s Clean Power Plan, GLOBALWARM-
ING.ORG (July 2, 2014), www.globalwarming.org/2014/07/02/primer-the-ongo-
ing-controversy-over-whether-clean-air-act-§111d-authorizes-epas-clean-power-
plan/ (arguing that House version of 1990 CAA section 111(d) amendment con-
trols and that it precludes the EPA from regulating hazardous air pollutant sources, 
not just pollutants, under section 111(d)).  
 159  See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 
34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Standards of 
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, & 98).  
 160  See Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-
plan-overview.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (noting that the Clean Power Plan 
is flexible: “reflecting the different needs of different states”). 
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to include greenhouse gases, evading potential problems created by 
the Court’s decision in UARG.161 Recall that the Court in UARG did 
not accept the broad definition of “pollutant” settled in Massachu-
setts,162 which included greenhouse gases.163 Instead, UARG de-
cided the definition of “pollutant” should be determined based on 
the context of the specific section at issue.164 Nevertheless, a con-
textual reading of the language in section 111(d) favors the broad 
application of “pollutant” offered in Massachusetts.  
Section 111(d) states that the EPA may regulate “any existing 
source of any air pollutant” so long as it is not already regulated 
under sections 108, 109, or 112 and could be regulated as a new 
source under section 111(b).165 There is no pollutant-specific re-
striction, unlike in the PSD context where the EPA’s regulations 
have interpreted air pollutant as limited to “regulated” air pollu-
tants.166 Section 111(d) is merely limited by its statutory language 
which is still broad: pollutants must already have a standard of per-
formance for new stationary sources and must not be covered by any 
other provision of the CAA.167  
Ultimately, courts will likely uphold the EPA’s current interpre-
tation of section 111(d), which supports the regulation of green-
house gas emissions from source categories. The categorization is 
unlikely to dramatically expand agency authority because section 
111(d) gives states and regulated parties the flexibility to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions based on their individual infrastructure.168 
Utilizing the regulatory options under section 111(d) would drasti-
cally help climate mitigation efforts, specifically when utilized to 
enforce emissions from the animal agriculture industry.  
                                                                                                         
 161  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(2012). 
 162  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 555–56 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s reliance on the CAA’s “capacious definition of ‘air pol-
lutant’”).  
 163  Id. at 528–29 (majority opinion). 
 164  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 143 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014). 
 165  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 166  Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 143 S. Ct. at 2440; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2), 
(b)(1) (2018). 
 167  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 168  See Letter from Thomas Carbonell, Envtl. Def. Fund Dir. of Regulatory 
Policy, to Journalist (2015), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/clean-
powerplan_strong_legal_foundation.pdf; Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Over-
view, supra note 160. 
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Regulating CAFOs under section 111(b) and (d) would give the 
CAA maximum regulatory effect because it would allow the regu-
lation of both existing and new sources of greenhouse gas pollution 
directly. The EPA’s regulatory authority here is distinct from its 
power under sections 108 and 109 of the CAA, which in practice 
only allows regulation of a CAFO’s greenhouse gas emissions if the 
facility is already in need of permits for other emissions.169 Addi-
tionally, enforcing compliance of emission standards under sections 
111(b) and (d) have the potential to create sufficient incentives to 
alter harmful livestock industry practices. 
C. Applying Section 111 to CAFOs 
As an initial matter, the EPA must list CAFOs as a category of 
sources under section 111(b) and (d) in order for the standards to 
apply. Section 111(b) empowers the EPA to specify categories of 
stationary emissions sources that “cause[], or contribute[] signifi-
cantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare.”170 As previously explained, the 
statutory test is whether the group of sources emits air pollutants 
that endanger health or welfare. The EPA has broad discretion to 
determine and revise these “source categories.”171 The Agency lists 
the categories in the Code of Federal Regulations, covering sources 
in most major industrial sectors of the economy.172 While non-profit 
organizations have petitioned for CAFO inclusion, unfortunately, 
the EPA has not yet listed CAFOs as a source category under section 
111.173 It remains difficult to assess the likelihood of Agency action 
                                                                                                         
 169  See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445; Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6, 8 (D. C. Cir. 2015). 
 170  42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
 171  See id. 
 172  See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018) (including emission guidelines for Large Mu-
nicipal Waste Combustors, Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, Infectious Waste In-
cinerators, etc.). 
 173  Humane Soc’y of the United States et al., Petition to List Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations Under Clean Air Act Section 111(b)(1)(A) of the 
Clean Air Act, and to Promulgate Standards for Performance Under Clean Air 
Act Sections 111(b)(1)(B) and 111(d) at 3 (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.humane 
society.org/assets/pdfs/litigation/hsus-et-al-v-epa-cafo-caa-petition.pdf [herein-
after Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations]; see infra Section 
IV.C.1. 
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because section 111 does not require listing a source category.174 
Nevertheless, as this subsection explains, making CAFOs regulated 
entities under the provision would improve public welfare and mit-
igate climate change by affecting industry manure management pol-
icies, thus supporting a listing. 
1. THE LIKELIHOOD OF AGENCY ACTION 
Determining the probability of the EPA listing CAFOs as a cat-
egorical source under section 111 of the CAA is difficult because 
the Agency retains broad discretion to identify a source through an 
endangerment finding.175 Despite this uncertainty, the EPA should 
list CAFOs as a regulated category under section 111 not only be-
cause methane and nitrous oxide emissions endanger public health 
and welfare, but also because similar sources are already regulated. 
The list of regulated entities is diverse: the Code of Federal Regula-
tions contains over ninety separate standards of performance cover-
ing sectors from “Large Municipal Waste Combustors” to “Existing 
Sewage Sludge Incineration Units.”176 Particularly compelling here 
are the standards of performance and emission guidelines for mu-
nicipal waste landfills.177 Although admittedly animal agriculture 
and waste landfills are distinct facilities, the source of emissions 
from these two entities are in fact analogous.  
Similar to municipal waste centers, CAFOs emit dangerously 
large amounts of methane and nitrous oxide as a result of their waste 
management systems.178 In fact, one dairy farm with 2,500 cows 
produces as much waste as a city with around 411,000 residents.179 
Although as an industry CAFOs serve a distinct function to waste 
centers, both facilities endanger public health and the environment 
through the emissions of greenhouse gases as a result of biological 
                                                                                                         
 174  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
 175   Section 111(b) states that “the Administrator shall . . . publish (and from 
time to time thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of stationary sources;” 
therefore, there are no statutory constraints on the EPA’s authority to identify and 
list sources. See id. 
 176  See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60. 
 177  Id. § 60.30c–.36c. 
 178  See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 10,855. 
 179  BARTH ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.  
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waste.180 Consequently, similar to municipal waste facilities, 
CAFOs should also be listed as a source category under section 111.  
While the EPA has broad discretion to revise and add sources, 
citizen groups are empowered to propose a listing and compel 
agency action. In 2009, the Humane Society of the United States, 
along with several environmental organizations, petitioned the EPA 
to add CAFOs to the list of sources regulated under sections 111(b) 
and (d), on the grounds that they are stationary source emitters of 
greenhouse gases, which cause, or contribute significantly to, air 
pollution and can endanger public health and welfare.181 Further-
more, the groups asserted that regulation of CAFO emissions was 
effective, reasonable, and would ensure the use of new technologies 
for mitigation efforts.182 
After the EPA failed to acknowledge the petition, the groups 
filed a federal lawsuit compelling response by the Agency.183 In 
2016, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the 
suit on purely procedural grounds due to lack of jurisdiction.184 The 
court found jurisdiction arose under the CAA,185 rather than the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,186 and the advocacy group plaintiffs 
failed to meet the CAA’s notice requirements.187 Decidedly, the 
court did not conclude that listing CAFOs as a category source under 
the CAA was unlawful; the court’s decision rested entirely on pro-
cedural inadequacies, rather than a judgment based on the merits.188 
Essentially, the court did not state that listing CAFOs would be un-
reasonable or an overreach of agency authority. Therefore, this case 
should not deter further petitions issued by advocacy groups, nor 
should it discourage a direct listing by the EPA. 
                                                                                                         
 180  See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Commercial/Residential, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-green 
house-gas-emissions#commercial-and-residential (last visited Jan. 2, 2019). 
 181  Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, supra note 173, 
at 3. 
 182  Id. at 63–67. 
 183  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Humane Soc’y of the 
United States v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-cv-0141).  
 184  Humane Soc’y of the United States, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 286.  
 185  42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
 186   5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 187  Humane Soc’y of the United States, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 286–88. 
 188  Id. 
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Unfortunately, the EPA rejected the petition at the end of 2017, 
claiming a need for “more accurate methodologies for estimating 
[CAFO air] emissions.”189 In its letter to petitioners, the Agency ex-
plained that once it “has sufficient information on CAFO emissions, 
it will determine the appropriate regulatory approach to address 
those emissions.”190 The EPA’s alleged need for additional infor-
mation seems suspicious, as the Agency has supposedly been mon-
itoring CAFO emissions since 2005.191 Continued pressure from ad-
vocacy groups could compel the EPA to conclude its study of 
CAFOs and finally list animal agriculture facilities as source cate-
gories under the CAA. 
2. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR LISTING CAFOS 
Additionally, the policy implications of regulating the animal 
agriculture sector under section 111 encourages listing CAFOs as a 
category source of air pollutants. Section 111 offers the most effec-
tive answer to the CAFO greenhouse gas emissions problem be-
cause it allows for direct regulation of these animal agriculture fa-
cilities. The definition of performance standards under section 111 
is exceptionally broad as it permits the EPA to consider “nonair 
quality health and environmental impact” in setting standards.192 
Further, the provision allows the EPA to “distinguish among classes, 
types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the purpose of 
establishing such standards.”193 Thus, in setting national goals for 
CAFO greenhouse gas emissions, the Agency can still customize its 
standards to the diversity of CAFO facilities—which vary in size 
and type.194 
Further, under section 111 all CAFOs would be regulated uni-
formly as a source category, thus establishing a national threshold 
                                                                                                         
 189  Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Jonathan Lov-
vorn & Daneil Lutz, The Humane Soc’y of the United States at 3 (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0638-0003 
(follow link titled “View Document”). 
 190  Id. at 4. 
 191  See Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, su-
pra note 101.  
 192  42 U.S.C. at § 7411(a)(1)(2012). 
 193  Id. § 7411(b)(2). 
 194  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23, 122.42 (2018). 
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standard of emissions.195 As mentioned previously, under section 
111(b)(5) the EPA cannot force a specific industry technology sys-
tem;196 however, CAFOs would still be subject to uniform emission 
standards established by the provision.197 Moreover, the standards 
implemented under section 111 could require specific work prac-
tices if certain emissions would be too difficult to measure—as has 
been done in coal processing plants.198 Because the bulk of CAFO 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions derive from concentrated ma-
nure and enteric fermentation,199 work practice regulations—or even 
traditional emission standards under section 111(d)—would force 
CAFOs to confront their waste management policies. 
3. ADJUSTING THE CAFO MODEL 
If the EPA listed CAFOs as a source category under section 
111(b) and (d)—in accordance with policy rationales described 
above—new and existing CAFOs would have to alter their manure 
management practices to diminish methane and nitrous oxide emis-
sions. Ending the CAFO model entirely by moving animals out of 
metal buildings and onto grazing lands is a potential industry policy 
choice. Liquid manure stored in anaerobic environments within la-
goons release ninety percent (90%) more methane than solid manure 
that decomposes aerobically in grazing systems.200 While pasture-
raised livestock may produce less methane, the grazing system is 
                                                                                                         
 195  Recall that because under section 111 standards are implemented against 
source categories rather than specific pollutants, each listed category is regulated 
uniformly depending on specified emission criteria for that source. See 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60. 
 196  42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5). 
 197  Id. § 7411(b). For examples of different emission criteria for various listed 
categories see 40 C.F.R. pt. 60. 
 198  After finding it “difficult and prohibitively expensive to measure actual 
[particulate matter] emissions from individual open storage [coal] piles or road-
ways,” the EPA implemented work practice standards for open storage piles of 
coal, rather than emission limitations. Standards of Performance for Coal Prepa-
ration and Processing Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,950, 51,950, 51,954 (Oct. 8, 2009) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 199  See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 7, at ES-21, 5-1; Ripple et al., supra note 
3, at 2–3. 
 200  Jun et al., supra note 34, at 322; see Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 
10,855 (“When manure is left as a solid . . . on . . .  pasture land[], it typically 
decomposes aerobically and produces little to no methane.”). 
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resource intensive and often requires land-clearing and deforesta-
tion—both of which contribute significantly to climate change.201  
Another potential solution, digesters, has emerged within the an-
imal agriculture industry as a new technology to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions from animal waste.202 Anaerobic digesters capture 
methane from CAFO manure management systems and convert it to 
biogas, a renewable energy source.203 Biogas—consisting of fifty to 
seventy percent (50–70%) methane, can be used onsite to power 
farms or it can be sold for use offsite.204 However, digesters are ex-
pensive and only possible financially by the largest CAFOs, there-
fore likely incentivizing the growth of CAFO facilities.205 Further-
more, digesters address only a portion of the methane emissions, and 
none of the nitrous oxide emissions, resulting from livestock pro-
duction.206 They also cannot alleviate enteric fermentation, caused 
by the breathing and belching of ruminants, which represents a 
much larger share of methane emissions than manure waste.207  
Additionally, while this Note concerns the climate change im-
pacts of CAFOs, these facilities do not exist in a vacuum and have 
                                                                                                         
 201  See, e.g., Paul West et al., Leverage Points for Improving Global Food 
Security and the Environment, 345 SCI. 325, 326 (identifying Brazil and Indonesia 
as agents for reducing agriculture’s impact on climate change through tropical 
deforestation).  
 202  See THE WHITE HOUSE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN – STRATEGY TO REDUCE 
METHANE EMISSIONS 6–7 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-03-28_final.pdf. 
 203  Id. at 6 (“Biogas systems are proven and effective technology to process 
organic waste and generate renewable energy.”).  
 204  Id. at 7 (“The Dairy Power project report findings show a $3 billion market 
potential through the products and co-products developed by mature digester sys-
tems that process manure and commercial food waste, with additional value for 
potential nutrient trading markets . . . .”).  
 205  See Nicole G. Di Camillo, Comment, Methane Digesters and Biogas Re-
covery––Masking the Environmental Consequences of Industrial Concentrated 
Livestock Production, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 365, 375–78 (2011). 
 206  See id. at 374–75 (critiquing methane digesters as an expensive, and at best, 
partial solution to CAFO greenhouse gas emissions).  
 207  See id. at 372–73, 378–79 (explaining that bio-digesters are meant to miti-
gate emissions from manure, rather than other biological processes, and that en-
teric digestion produces the majority of methane emissions related to livestock 
production). 
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created considerable externalities that digesters are incapable of ad-
dressing: harm to animal welfare,208 antibiotic resistance,209 and air 
and water pollution for surrounding, predominately low-income 
communities of color.210 Thus, digesters, appearing facially benefi-
cial in the climate change mitigation context, potentially distract 
from other impacts of CAFOs.211 Nevertheless, although a partially 
deficient solution, digesters would ameliorate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from CAFOs more than maintaining the status quo. Further, 
digesters would presumably appeal to industry because adding the 
technology is theoretically simpler than readjusting CAFOs com-
pletely towards a grazing model. 
It is worth noting that decreasing the size of CAFOs by limiting 
the number of animals per facility or the quantity of CAFOs nation-
ally would decrease the amount of waste and enteric fermentation 
produced—thus simply diminishing methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions in accordance with a section 111 regulation. This policy 
choice, however, depends on consumer preferences for animal prod-
ucts. Meat consumption continues to rise in the United States,212 
caused by industry oversupply and agriculture subsidies provided by 
taxpayer dollars that incentivize consumption.213 Consumer prefer-
ences for plant-based diets, as opposed to those heavy in meat and 
dairy products, would amplify section 111 regulations by diminish-
ing the demand for CAFOs. Ultimately, this policy action relies on 
educating the public about the environmental harms and public wel-
fare externalities created by animal agriculture.214  
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4. THE FEASIBILITY OF A NATIONAL STANDARD TODAY 
Establishing a national standard for CAFOs under section 111(b) 
and (d) is an effective use of the existing CAA framework because 
it would allow the regulation of both existing and new sources of 
greenhouse gas pollution directly. However, under President 
Trump’s administration—which has proposed a repeal of the Obama 
administration’s Clean Power Plan—expecting the EPA to take ac-
tion against the powerful agriculture sector seems naively optimis-
tic.215 Recall that, historically, agricultural exceptionalism has led 
policymakers to concede to agricultural interest against competing 
environmental concerns.216  
In light of these circumstances, it is necessary to use legislation 
at the state and local levels in order to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions from CAFOs, even if only incrementally. Several states have 
sought to curb agricultural impacts on climate change by passing 
laws or initiatives in support of soil carbon sequestration, which 
aims to decrease the amount of methane and other carbon-based 
greenhouse gases.217 While most of these programs address climate 
                                                                                                         
tainability concerns in their dietary guidelines. BARBARA E. MILLEN ET AL., SCI-
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nent vegetative buffers on farmland bordering lakes and streams, which will in-
crease soil carbon sequestration in addition to decreasing pollutant run-off.  2015 
Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. Ch. 4 (S.F. 5) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of MINN. STAT. chs. 103A–114b (2018)). The Oklahoma Carbon Sequestra-
tion Enhancement Act quantifies carbon sequestration in order to market emis-
sions in the future. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A § 27A-3-4-101 (2019).  
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implications from farming and agricultural practices generally, Cal-
ifornia’s State Legislature specifically directed its Air Resources 
Board to reduce methane emissions from dairy farms through strict 
emission standards.218  
CONCLUSION 
Emissions from both enteric fermentation and manure, a result 
of intensive factory farms known as CAFOs,219 must be regulated 
under a national framework in order to properly mitigate the United 
States’s contribution to climate change. Setting national standards—
as opposed to relying exclusively on state action—would allow an 
industry wide compliance and prevent CAFOs from concentrating 
in states with lenient regulations.  
Relying on the existing CAA framework is essential as no for-
malized regulations exist specifically addressing CAFO emissions 
of methane and nitrous oxide.220 The EPA is empowered to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the CAA and can address emissions from 
CAFOs under stationary source provisions in sections 108, 109, and 
111 of the Act.221 Section 111 performance standards, unlike those 
in sections 108 and 109, are category specific rather than pollutant 
specific.222 Further, regulating CAFOs under section 111 is more ef-
ficient and effective because it permits the direct oversight of both 
existing and new sources of methane and nitrous oxide emissions.223 
The EPA’s regulatory authority here is distinct from its power under 
sections 108 and 109, which only allow regulation of a CAFO’s 
greenhouse gas emissions if the facility needs permits for other pol-
lutants.224  
For section 111 to apply, the EPA must list CAFOs as a source 
category—which it has not yet done despite petitions from citizen 
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groups.225 The likelihood of the EPA listing CAFOs as a source is 
uncertain because the Agency has broad discretion to revise its cat-
egorizations.226 Despite this uncertainty, the EPA should list CAFOs 
as a category because similar sources are regulated—such as munic-
ipal waste centers.227 Moreover, making CAFOs regulated entities 
under the provision would improve public welfare and mitigate cli-
mate change by affecting industry manure management policies—
thus supporting a listing. 
In assessing their waste storage policies, the livestock sector 
could adopt several potential solutions: (1) end the CAFO model 
entirely by raising only grass-fed animals, although this raises cli-
mate change concerns as a result of the necessary land-clearing;228 
(2) utilize methane digesters, which do not address methane and ni-
trous oxide emissions from enteric fermentation;229 or (3) decrease 
operation size, which would only be viable from the industry’s per-
spective if the public demanded less meat and dairy products. 
Adopting methane digesters is the most likely outcome, as it pre-
sumably presents the least damage to the agriculture industry from 
the solutions presented. Albeit an incomplete answer, digesters 
would at least address some of CAFOs’ climate change impacts.  
Climate change is the defining challenge of our time. However, 
it remains politically divisive. While substantive legal reform ad-
dressing CAFOs impact on climate change at the federal level is po-
tentially only distantly achievable, it is necessary to confront this 
issue in the hopes of proper mitigation.  
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